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3. Unity and disunity of aims of Frege’s logic and Peano’s
mathematical logic.









• University in Turin;
• Mathematical logic;
• Peano founded the journal 
„Rivista di Matematica” 
(1891).
1. Preserved letters
• Frege an Peano, without date, after1891 (draft version found 
in Frege’s legacy);
• Peano an Frege, 30. 1. 1894;
• Peano an Frege, 10. 2. 1894;
• Peano an Frege, 14. 8. 1895;
• Peano an Frege, 4. 10. 1895
• Peano an Frege, 5. 4. 1896
• Frege an Peano, 29. 9. 1896, published in „Rivista…”, 1899
• Peano an Frege, without date, published in „Rivista…”, 1899
• Peano an Frege, 3. 10. 1896
• Peano an Frege, 14. 10. 1896
• Frege an Peano, without date (draft version found in Frege’s
legacy);
• Peano an Frege, 7. 1. 1903.
2. Introductory remarks.
„Golden period” of their academic activity
1. The peak of Frege’s logicism, a standpoint in which
arithmetical notions are said to have been reduced to pure
logical notions.
2. Peano, before starting the correspondence, published
Arithmetices principia, nova methodo exposita (1889)
and following papers during the correspondence:






Frege to Philip Jourdain
(1879-1919) 
I believe I have perfected my conceptual
notation somewhat in this work [ Grundgesetze
der Arithmetik] (…) I regarded it in many
respects as better than Peano’s, even though it
may appear less simple at the first glance (Frege
to Jourdain, 23. 9. 1902, s. 73).
Peano wrote:
„I have some difficulty in reading your
symbols; but I shall get better at it, and 
if I still find difficulties, I shall take the 
liberty of writing to you
(Peano to Frege 30.01.1894).
3. Aims
of Frege’s concept script 
and Peano’s mathematical logic. 
Unity of their aims
Their common aim was to improve mathematics 
by logic with the small number of primitive 
undefinable signs. As it was written by Peano they
„[…] are taking the same route in science (Peano an
Frege, 30.01.1894, p. 178) 
and they have much to gain from the parallel 
between their logical systems (Peano to Frege, 
7.01.1903). 
The scientific activity of both Frege and Peano resulted 
from the intention to implement
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's (1646-1716) 
postulate of creating universal language.
Disunity of their aims:
Peano’s primary interest was in axiomatics, that he never 
used the mathematical logic developed by him for the 
reduction of mathematical concepts to logical concepts, 
and that, instead, he denied the validity of such a reduction.
(Kennedy 2002, p. 11)
That Peano considered his work no more than 
axiomatization, and not an answer to the basic question—
What is a number?, may be seen in “Sul concetto di 
numero.” (Kennedy 2002, p. 8) 
• Peano created logic as a useful tool to axiomatize
mathematics (arithmetic and geometry as well) and as a 
tool to examine the principles of arithmetic and geometry.
• Frege created his logical system to realize logistic 
program.
• Peano did not remark the differences between his aim of 
creating logical system and Frege’s. He maintained that 
Frege was his predecessor in the area of mathematical 
logic
(G. Peano: Recenzione: G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, 
begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet. „Rivista di matematica “ 1895, vol. 5, p. 
122). 
4. Topics raised in the correspondence
List of topics:
4.1. The comparison of logical symbolisms.
4.2. The required number of primitive, undefinable signs.
4.3. Symbols of quantification and its understanding;
4.4 Translation of some of Peano’s formulas into Frege’s
logic.
4.5 Two kinds of propositions: general and singular.
4.6 The conditions that should be met by a correct definition.
4.7 Critique of definitions introduced by Peano, in particular 
definitions of addition and equality.
4.8 Other topics: class, identity, what is function, semiotic-
philosophical notions.
4.1. Comparison of logical symbolisms 
They claimed that „[…] the parallel between
the two systems of writing, 
Mathematical Logic = Conceptual Notation
will have much to gain”
(Peano to Frege 7.01.1903). 
They explained how to read 
• the Peano's sign of deduction "ɔ" 
• and the Frege’s conditional stroke
We have given two names to the sign „ɔ”:
1. „we deduce” and
2. „is contained”,
and it can also be read in many other ways. This does not mean
that the sign „ɔ” has several meanings. My is better expressed by
saying that the sign „ɔ” has a single meaning, but that in ordinary
language this meaning is represented by several different words,
according to the circumstances
(Peano to Frege, 14.10.1896, s. 121).
4.2. The required number of primitive, undefinable signs.
• In Formulaire Peano wrote that all relations and operations between 
propositions and classes are reduced to six represented by symbols: 
• The first three are primitive and undefinable, the next three are 
defined by the primitive terms.
• Peano maintained that there are five characters in Frege’s system: 
How to understand a primitive term
• Frege - all undefinable signs in a logical system. 
• Peano - number of constants.
• Frege doubted that Peano used only three undefinable 
symbols. (Frege - Peano, 29. 9. 1896) and Peano finally 
agreed with him (8 Peano to Frege, without date). 
• For example, Peano introduced names for particular sets 
of numbers like positive numbers and rational numbers 
while Frege defined them using primitive signs (7 Frege –
Peano, 29.09.1896).
4.3. Symbols of quantification 
and its understanding.
The comarison given by Frege
[…]  your
"f(x)⊃x F(x)” 
would correspond to my  
(1 Frege – Peano, witout date, p. 109).
Peano: General quantifier
• Peano, Aritmetices Principia. Nova methodo exposita
1889, s. VIII
• It means whatever are x and y, from proposition a one 
deduces b.
• In Notations de logique mathématique (1894) Peano 
introduced another notation for quantification, downwards
arrows bottom (someone is) and upwards arrow
(everyone is).
a ↓ ε b                              a ↑ ε b
5. The problem of antinomy
• In a letter to Philip Jourdain, Frege wrote that the problem of 
antinomy also referred to Peano's logic (Frege to Jourdain, 
23.09.1902, p. 73).
• Among the above themes, there is no discussion of the problem of 
antinomy, although Russell informed Peano about the problem in a 
letter to him  earlier than in the famous first letter to Frege from 
June 16, 1902 . At the end of this letter to Frege, Russell wrote in 
Peano's notation the antinomy of a class not belonging to itself, 
adding that he had already written about it to Peano, but he had not 
received any answer yet. 
• The first of the nine published letters by Peano to Russell is dated 
March 19, 1901 and there is no reference to the problem of 
antinomy. Peano mentioned “the antinomy combined with the name 
of Russell" only in the letter of February 16, 1906. 
• Therefore, the problem of antinomy was not taken up by Peano as 
quickly as one would expect, despite the fact that the antinomy is 
also constructible on the ground of his mathematical logic. 
6. Conclusions
• It was disunity of assumed logical symbolism and in some logical 
solutions. They did not agree how much their systems count 
primitive terms. Frege criticized assumed by Peano definitions of 
equality and addition. They both did not agree what it means to 
create a good definition.
• There was much more unity than disunity between them. They did 
not struggle but well understand each other. However, there is a lot 
of constructive and serious criticism in their letters. It is why their 
correspondence is worth to study seriously.
• Frege wrote two papers on unity and disunity of his and Peanos
logic:
1. Über die Begriffsschrift des Herrn Peano und meine eigene
(1897);
2. Begründung meiner strengeren Grundsätze des Definierens
(1897/1898).
Peano quoted Frege’s papers five times. In comparison with his other
quotations – it is very little.
Unity and disunity between theirs logics:
[…] mathematicians agree indeed on the 
external form of their propositions but not 
on the thoughts they attach to them, and 
these are surely what is essential (Frege to 
Peano, without date, p. 195).
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